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A question about terminology: It would seem to me that Wilson would at-least concede at some level that man being created in the image of God would in someway “innately” know the difference between right and wrong. Wilson originally concedes that all men know right from wrong. Why is ‘innate’ not a proper word for this natural condition?
Comment by Bob Moore — March 13, 2009 @ 8:24 pm
Bob,
Good point. In the forthcoming analysis I address what happened during the debate on this general issue, but I did not think to bring up – once again – the problem with the word ‘innate.’ What first comes to mind is Wilson’s original claim that humanity already has the requisite ‘ethical information,’ which entails that morality is not only innate, but biologically innate (warning: Wilson’s rhetoric is in flux on this point). Certainly it is sound to interpret this as a claim (in view of Wilson’s citation of Romans 1) that morality is all hard-wired, in virtue of creation in the image of God. The closest Hitchens gets to this is a directing to Darwin’s view about a “well-marked social instinct” in social animals that naturally leads to a moral conscience once intelligence is developed near to our own.
Comment by Michael Metzler — March 14, 2009 @ 10:48 am
Well, I visited your site once after you sent me an email inviting me to do so. — Don’t think I’ll waste my time here again.
I have been a member of Christ Church and wonder to how many others there you sent such an invitation. I hope you’ll post this comment, but are you honest enough to do so? Perhaps I won’t know in this lifetime since I do not plan to revisit your site.
Comment by notgonna — March 16, 2009 @ 10:41 am
Hi Kirker notgonna. Thanks for the comment, although I am not sure what the argument is supposed to be here. Feel free to come back and expand the point. Is this a gesture to all other Kirkers indicating they should follow your lead and not read anything here or dialog? Thanks.
Comment by metzler — March 16, 2009 @ 11:43 am
Michael,
I’m not a ‘Kirker’ so I guess it is ok for me to make a comment here. Nice quote from Lewis. Look forward to your analysis of this interesting (bizzare?) exchange. One thought came to me. In the quote from Hitchens’ ‘Mortimer Rests His Case’, Hume is not referring to the Moral Argument is he? Mortimer is ok with absurdity it seems, but I doubt this means he is ok with ousting all ideas of morality.
Comment by Jefferson — March 16, 2009 @ 6:36 pm
Jefferson,
Yes, great point. Really, the Moral Argument is just a species of what I will call the Argument from Meaning. According to Wilson, Hitchens cannot justify moral claims, but this is because Hitchens cannot justify – according to Wilson – his use of ‘reason,’ or even the use of language. There is no meaning without God, just “matter in motion, man.” There is no ethical, linguistic, rational, social, or aesthetic meaning (meaningful distinction) here in our human world without the presupposition of the Christian Trinity.
But the Moral Argument stands out as the prototype, and not only does it pack the biggest rhetorical punch, it is really the only species of the Argument from Meaning that has some credence on the face of it. I think one reason C.S. Lewis’ version of the Moral Argument is more successful is that it does not depend on the Argument from Meaning. It is a little more along the lines of Bahnsen’s pure transcendental argument – although with a healthy dose of C.S. Lewis and no Bahnsen!
As for Mortimer, I am not sure about this after reading Hitchens’ article in Vanity Fair. Mortimer seems a bit ambivelent about both a moral and a meaningful cosmos – seems to enjoy moral absurdity to get a rise out of pretty women.
Comment by Michael Metzler — March 16, 2009 @ 8:01 pm