The Moral Argument, Part 3: Ethical Information



bio_hitchensMy summary of the debate between Wilson and Hitchens (Canon Press) can be found here.  My analysis follows in four parts, beginning with this entry. Here is the map of what is to come:

1) Part 3 – Ethical Information:  The question over humanity’s access to “ethical information” jeopardizes the continuation of the debate beyond round two. Upon analysis, it appears the debate was over in round two.

2) Part 4 – Immoral Defense:  This debate is not just about morality, but also the expression of morality, the morality of Hitchens and Wilson. This moral expression has revealed a good deal of immorality, and oddly enough, Hitchens, the atheist, is not the one responsible. (He didn’t even say “fucking” at just the right Hitch moment.) I want to address the immorality of Wilson’s moral stance. If Wilson’s defense of Christian morality is itself immoral, then it is self-refuting.

3) Part 5 – Strenuous Conditions:  I want to take a close look at Wilson’s various challenges and questions. On analysis, it appears Wilson offers not one challenge, but five. Wilson demands that Hitchens provide the following:

a) A warrant, or rational warrant, or justification for his moral beliefs.  b) Definitions for ethical terms.  c) A standard for moral evaluation.  d) An account, without reference to a theistic metaphysic, of language, meaning, concepts, reason, truth, and the process of argumentation.  e) A source of moral authority that should be obeyed.

I will seek to explain how, as Hitchens put it, all these “strenuous conditions are surplus to requirements.”

4) Part 6 – Moral Philosophy:  Hitchens progressively revealed his own moral philosophy throughout the debate, whereas Wilson never stopped insisting that Hitchens was simply refusing to address Wilson’s challenges. Hitchens’ own view on morality deserves an analysis before investigating whether Hitchens did or did not offer a sufficient answer to Wilson.

_________

1) Ethical Information

Is Christianity Good for the World? Hitchens answers: One reason Christianity is not Good for the world is that Christianity is not an origin of moral precepts; and if not an origin of moral precepts, then an unlikely candidate for an origin of moral goodness, much less the fount of moral goodness; and if this is so, it would seem hard to appreciate how Christianity is good for the world in any immediate and practical sense. This is not an unimportant consideration. The church’s cultural boasting remains unhampered by her continued multiplication of moral atrocities and absurdities. How is this if she does not at the very least bring us the standard by which to judge her hypocrisy?

This was Wilson’s chance to start the debate strong. But in his eagerness to lecture this intimidating foe, Wilson starts off a little too strong. Rarely on the lookout for subtle distinctions when confronted with a rhetorical skirmish or philosophical musing, Wilson did not surprise us when he failed to allow for complexity on the issue Hitchens raised. Rather, Hitchens was entirely wrong – unprepared for the debate, perhaps, or simply ignorant about things pertaining to the Christian religion. The truth is, Wilson boasted, the world does not need religion for ethical information at all. Hitchens missed the entire point. This has never been an important capability claimed for Christianity. Christianity is rather about forgiveness and the ability to live the way all people already know they should live. “We already knew” the standard; God’s law is to an extent even revealed in the hearts of all humans.

So morality is indeed fully innate on this view. This point becomes obvious after brief reflection on the organic interrelationship between the ‘moral precepts’ of a society and the evaluative emotions and normative practices within a society. It would be absurd to suggest that people have always known what is right, good, and just in principle, yet had never appreciated and practiced what is right, good, and just.

In response to this, Hitchens thanks Wilson for admitting that “morality has nothing at all to do with the supernatural. . . I am happy to leave our disagreement exactly where it is.” Hitchens knew that Wilson could not ultimately disband with special revelation on this point, and therefore saw this as the end of the debate – so long as Wilson would stay put.

But Wilson would not stay put. In reply, Wilson first retorted that this was not what he was claiming at all and eventually explained that “we need the direction of the standard because we are confused sinners.” This is a clear reversal of Wilson’s first strong statement. Now, Christianity is good for the world since Christianity provides us moral direction through moral standards. Christianity is an immediate and practical good that is necessary; otherwise we would just be left in our moral confusion and ignorance.

Hitchens allows this contradiction to go untouched in Round two, and so in round 3 Wilson apparently feels at liberty to make the claim stronger: “Mosaic law is important because ancient man did not know and ‘modern man still doesn’t know’.” So the original “we already knew” now becomes “ancient man did not know.” This brings us to either pure sophistry or pure contradiction; perhaps it is both. I will allow the reader to take their pick between the three options.

But then Wilson swings back in the other direction, presupposing a common knowledge, separate from ancient law-code, of “the standards of civilized life.” The purpose of the law-code was simply to provide a standard to deal with those who set aside these innate standards of civilized life “to suit themselves.”

So here is where Wilson has led us: First, humanity does sufficiently know. Second, they know but are confused. Third, they do not know. And finally, they know again in the form of the standards of ‘civilized life.’ I must say that Wilson’s side of this debate is one fun roller coaster ride. But the ride ends right back at Hitchens’ original assessment: Wilson admits that “morality has nothing at all to do with the supernatural.” The supernatural is entirely irrelevant to Wilson’s fuss over law-code. Whether or not the law-code used by humans is thought up by a secular legislature or inscribed on stone by Zeus makes no difference to its utility, which is, according to Wilson, the ability to provide a standard to deal with those who set aside innate standards of civilized life to “suit themselves.” In Round 4, Hitchens rightly responds to this mess by pointing out that Wilson “speaks absurdly” over the issue of what humanity does or does not know about morality.

And if that was not enough, a decisive skirmish is found nestled in this discussion over ethical information. To support the claim that man actually “does not know” right from wrong and therefore requires divine law-code, Wilson says, “We have abortion, infanticide, partial-birth abortion, euthanasia, genocide, stem-cell research, capital punishment, and unjust war. Murder is the big E on the eye chart, and we still can’t see it that clearly.”

In reply, Hitchens points out that Wilson is “trapped in the net” of his own making. Genocide and slavery have been “positively recommended in holy writ,” and abortion is denounced in the Oath of Hippocrates (and I add, not holy writ). Wilson’s reference to scripture’s law-code is therefore vacuous. Wilson makes no attempt to resuscitate his case, nor does he once address the alleged arbitrariness of the biblical ‘standard,’ which can be used for or against some of the most important moral issues, such as slavery. Perhaps the debate was over in Round 2.

(photograph taken from Vanity Fair)

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